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Recent Decisions
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - ARTICLE IlI - ARTICLE IX - STATUS OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY USED AS COLLATERAL - DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania split on the question of
when the Deficiency Judgment Act places a debtor's personal
property offered as collateral beyond the reach of a judgment
creditor when the agreement between the parties can be
interpreted under either Article Il or Article IX of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
Horbal v. Moxham Nat'1 Bank, 697 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997).
The Deficiency Judgment Act requires a judgment creditor to
follow certain procedures to apply the debtor's personal assets to
an outstanding loan upon the debtor's default.' Whether the asset in
question is considered a "personal" asset at the time a judgment
creditor forecloses on the loan determines whether the creditor
must follow the Deficiency Judgment Act to secure the asset.2 Once
the status of the asset has been determined, the court must analyze
the parties' intended classification of the asset pledged against the
value of the loan.3
In Horbal, the plaintiffs argued that the judgment creditor
erroneously applied the asset against their defaulted loan.4 The
plaintiffs contended that the asset was, at the time of foreclosure, a
personal asset.5 By virtue of this argument, plaintiffs requested the
payment of the value of the asset, interest earned and fees
1. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103 (West 1998).'
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Horbal v. Moxham National Bank, 697 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997).
5. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 578.
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associated with obtaining their judgment.6
On February 4, 1988, Moxham National Bank ("Moxham") agreed
to lend $120,000 to John Horbal, Anthony Horbal and Elaine Adams
("debtors," "assignors," or "Horbals"). The loan was partially
secured by a mortgage on the debtors' interest in a parcel of real
estate located at 502 Main Street in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.
7
Moxham properly recorded the mortgage on February 11, 1988.8
The Horbals also pledged a $25,000 Certificate of Deposit ("CD") as
additional security for the loan.9 This loan transaction was
completed on February 18, 1988.10 The pledge of the CD was
necessary because the value of the real property at 502 Main Street
was insufficient to fully secure the loan."
The assignment granted Moxham a full power of attorney
authorizing Moxham "to ask, demand, collect, receive, receipt for,
sue for, compound and give acquittance for any and all amounts
which may be due or become due and payable under the
Account."12 Moxham essentially gained the legal right to make
demands on all or part of the account without notice to, or
agreement of, the assignors. 3 Once the assignors paid the loan in
full, or if the parties otherwise agreed, Moxham would release its
claim on the pledged CD.14 If, however, the Horbals failed to pay
the balance of the loan prior to maturity, or if they violated any
rule or requirement of the loan provisions, Moxham could, at its
discretion, withdraw any or all of the existing value of the
account.15
6. Id. at 579.




10. Horbal, 697 A2d. at 579. The Assignment of Security provided:
The undersigned, Anthony Horbal and John Horbal (Assignors), for and in
consideration of good and valuable consideration in hand paid, the receipt and
sufficiency of all of which is hearby acknowledged, does hearby ASSIGN, TRANSFER
and PLEDGE to the Moxham National Bank ... (hereinafter called Bank) all of
Assignors' right, title and interest, on Certificate of Deposit Number 2005581, in the
principal amount of Twenty Five thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($25,000) .. . (all of









In 1989, the Horbals defaulted on the loan16 and Moxham
initiated foreclosure proceedings against the property." On October
24, 1989, the common pleas court entered a default judgment in
favor of Moxham.1 The court also executed a Writ of Execution
upon the real property that was the subject of the loan. 9 Moxham
subsequently purchased the property for $666.40 at a sheriff's sale
held on December 14, 1990.20
The sheriff delivered the deed to Moxham on January 21, 1991.21
Moxham resold the property for $26,437 and applied the CD to the
unpaid balance of the loan - $116,000.22 The amount of the
liquidated CD consisted of $25,000 in principal and $1,437 in
accrued interest.2 Moxham filed no petition for judicial
determination of the fair market value of the real property.
24
John and Anthony Horbal subsequently assigned their legal rights
in the liquidation of the CD to Highland Financial, Ltd. and James
P. Walsh (collectively "plaintiffs). 25 The plaintiffs notified Moxham,
on November 21, 1991, of this assignment.26 The plaintiffs requested
that Moxham turn over the proceeds realized from the liquidation
of the CD, but Moxham refused.
27
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against Moxham, asserting that it
did not comply with the guidelines set forth in the Deficiency
Judgment Act.28 The plaintiffs claimed treble damages against
Moxham, alleging that Moxham received a "usurious" rate of
interest when it applied the CD to the outstanding balance of the
loan. 29 The plaintiffs also requested that the court award them
16. Id at 580.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Horbal, 697 A-2d at 580. A "writ of execution" renders the judgment or decree of a
court enforceable. Formal, written command of a court directing a sheriff or other official to
enforce a judgment through process of execution. BLACK'S LAw DIcIoNRY 1109 (6th ed.
1990).




24. Horba, 697 A-2d at 580. The Deficiency Judgment Act requires that this filing occur
within a six-month time period subsequent to the sale of the property which is the subject of
a foreclosure. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103 (West 1998).





[A] person who has paid a rate of interest for a loan or use of money at a rate in
1998
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litigation fees.30 The plaintiffs and Moxham filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.3 1 The trial court granted Moxham's motion on
June 22, 1993.32
The trial court found that the Deficiency Judgment Act did not
apply because the CD was not, at the time of foreclosure, a
"personal" asset .3 The court's rationale for this decision was based
on its finding that the CD agreement was independent of the
mortgage agreement.34 The trial court found that when the Horbals
defaulted on the mortgage, the CD became the property of
Moxham; thus, the CD could not have been the personal property
of the Horbals at the time of the sheriff's sale.35 Therefore, the
court found no reason to invoke the Deficiency Judgment Act.
36
Moxham, thus, it could apply the balance of the CD to the loan, at
any time after the mortgage assumed default status.37 By ruling the
Act inapplicable to the foreclosure proceedings, the trial court
concluded that plaintiff's request for payment of interest on the CD
and attorney's fees were no longer valid2 s
John Horbal, Anthony Horbal, Highland Financial, and James P.
Walsh (collectively "appellants") appealed to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, but Moxham again prevailed.3 After granting
allocatur, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deadlocked.40 By
failing to form a majority, the supreme court affirmed the decision
of the superior court.
41
Application of the Deficiency Judgment Act is appropriate when
excess of that provided for by this act or otherwise by law or has. paid charges
prohibited or in excess of those allowed by this act or otherwise by law may recover
triple the amount of such excess interest or charges in a suit at law against the
person who has collected such excess interest or charges.
41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 502 (West 1998).
30. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 580. "[If] a borrower or debtor, including but not limited to a
residential mortgage debtor, prevails in an action under this act, he shall recover the
aggregate amount of costs and expenses determined by the court to have been reasonably
incurred on his behalf in connection with the prosecution of such action, together with a
reasonable amount of attorney's fee." 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503(a) (West 1998).









40. Id. at 581.
41. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 581.
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the real property of a mortgagor is sold as the result of foreclosure
and the judgment creditor receives less than the amount of the
judgment, plus interest and costs.42 The judgment against the
debtor, under the Deficiency Judgment Act, is reduced by the fair
market value ("FMV") of the property purchased by the judgment
creditor at foreclosure, rather than by the foreclosure sale price."
The FMV is the price yielded under the depressed conditions of the
foreclosure sale" - the fair and just value of the property." The
legislature designed the Act to eliminate a debtor's continuing
personal liability after the creditor has acquired the debtor's real
property and its value (as determined by its subsequent sales price)
is sufficient to satisfy the amount remaining on the original debt."
The Act comes into play when real property of a debtor only
partially discharges the debt, such as when the property is sold for
less than the total of the original loan, plus associated costs and
expenses.47 The Deficiency Judgment Act, however, requires that
the creditor formally request the court to ascertain the FMV of the
real property within six months after its sale." If the creditor fails
to make a timely request for determination of the FMV, any or all
parties liable for the debt (or any other party claiming a legal
interest in the property) may petition the court to void the alleged
deficiency remaining due to the expiration of the statute of
limitations.49 If the court grants' the debtor's petition, the judgment
42. Id.
Whenever any real property is sold, directly or indirectly, to the judgment creditor in
execution proceedings and the price for which such property has been sold is not
sufficient to satisfy the amount of the judgment, interest and costs and the judgment
creditor seeks to collect the balance due on said judgment, interests and costs, the
judgment creditor shall petition the court having jurisdiction to fix the fair market
value of the real property sold. The petition shall be filed as a supplementary
proceeding in the matter in which the judgment was entered.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(a) (West 1998).
43. First Nat'l Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman, 527 A.2d 100, 105 (Pa. 1987).
44. Fetherman, 527 A.2d at 105.
45. Id.
46. Philip Green & Son, Inc. v. Kimwyd, Inc., 189 A-2d 231, 232-33 (Pa. 1963).
47. Fetherman, 527 A. 2d at 104.
48. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(a) (West 1998). See text accompanying note 43.
49. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 581.
If the judgment creditor shall fail to present a petition to fix the fair market value of
the real property sold within the time after the sale of such real property as provided
by section 5522 (relating to the six-month limitation), the debtor, obligor, guarantor or
any other person liable directly or indirectly to the judgment creditor for the payment
of the debt, or any person interested in any real estate which would, except for the
provisions of this section, be bound by the judgment, may file a petition, as a
supplementary petition in the matter in which the judgment was entered, in the court
1998 Horbal 623
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is designated as satisfied and all parties are freed from any
obligations arising after the date of sale.5°
The Act does not affect any contractual rights and duties
between mortgagor and mortgagee - it only sets the foundation
for the process of foreclosure and identifies the debtor's property
that may be taken by foreclosure. 51 The Horbals and Moxham
signed an agreement stipulating that Moxham had a full power of
attorney over the CD, which expressly granted Moxham the
authority to withdraw all or part of the value of the CD without
notice to the Horbals.
52
It is the direct application of the Act that was the basis for the
Moxham case. Whether the bank had the right to apply the Horbal's
CD to the mortgage without following the procedures of the
Deficiency Judgment Act was the crux of this case. In a split
decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the decision of
the Superior Court in favor of Moxham National Bank.3 This meant
that Moxham retained all of the Horbals' rights to the CD when
they made the original assignment.M The court stated that Moxham
had the discretion to liquidate the CD and apply the funds to the
unpaid balance prior or subsequent to the sheriff's sale based on
the express provisions of the assignment.55 The parties did not
dispute whether the CD could have been applied to the outstanding
mortgage prior to the sheriff's sale.56 They agreed that once the
loan assumed default status, compliance with the Act was not
necessary to liquidate the CD and that the Act applied after the
sale for the outstanding balance of the mortgage.
5 7
The Deficiency Judgment Act is applicable when real property is
sold to a judgment creditor for less than the amount of the loan in
having jurisdiction, setting forth the fact of the sale, and that no petition has been
filed within the time limited by statute after the sale to fix the fair market value of the
property sold, whereupon the court, after notice as prescribed by the general rule, and
being satisfied of such facts, shall direct the clerk to mark the payment satisfied,
released and discharged.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(d) (West 1998).
50. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(d) (West 1998). See text accompanying note 49.
51. Commercial Bldg. Ass'n v. Steen, 24 Pa. D. & C. 575 (1935).
52. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 579.
53. Id. at 578. Justice Castille, filed an Opinion in Support of Affirmance in which
Chief Justice Flaherty and Justice Zappala joined. Justice Newman fied an Opinion in
Support of Reversal in which Justices Cappy and Nigro joined. Id. at 584.
54. Horbal, 697 A-2d at 583.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 581.
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Horbal
default,5 including interest and costs. 5 9 In First Nat'l Consumer
Discount Co. v. Fetherman, judgment debtors requested the
common pleas court to enter the creditor's claim as satisfied and
award the debtors liquidated damages when the debtors' property
was sold at a sheriff's sale.60 The trial court found in favor of the
debtors and the creditor appealed. 61 The superior court affirmed in
part and reversed in part and the debtors appealed. 62 The supreme
court made two rulings.6 First, a judgment creditor must petition
the court for determination of the FMV of the property within six
months after the foreclosure sale of the property.6 If the creditor
fails to do so, the court will deem the obligation of the debtor
fulfilled.6 Also, the court ruled that when it deems the obligation
fulfilled by the debtor, but the creditor does not recognize the
court's ruling within thirty days after notification, the debtor is
entitled to an award of liquidated damages.6
The debtors obtained a mortgage for $31,416.00 on two unrelated
sections of real property.67 When the debtors defaulted on the loan,
the creditor submitted a complaint in mortgage foreclosure to the
Common Pleas Court of Bucks County.6 The court entered a
judgment for $27,600.00 in favor of the creditor.69 Shortly thereafter,
the creditor successfully bid $28,500 for one of the pieces of the
debtors' property at a sheriffs sale.70 After outstanding bills,
expenses associated with the property, and fees associated with the
sheriffs sales were paid, the remaining $26,912.24 went to the
creditor.71 Twenty-one months later, the debtors requested that the
creditor report the debtors' obligation as fulfilled. 72 Creditor's
counsel informed the debtors that the obligation would be
designated as fulfilled and that the creditor would make this report
58. First Nat'l Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman, 527 A.2d 100, 104-05 (P& 1987).
59. Id. at 105.
60. Id. at 102.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 105.
63. Fetherman, 527 A2d at 106.
64. Id. at 105.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 105-06.
67. Id. at 101-02.
68. Fetherman, 527 A.2d at 101-02.






to the court.73 After some months, when debtors had not received
any notice from the creditor, they requested the court to designate
the obligation as fulfilled and to award them liquidated damages.74
The trial court, in Fetherman, found in favor of the debtor,
awarding $13,800 in liquidated damages and designating the
obligation fufilled.75 The creditor appealed and the ruling was
affirmed by the superior court in favor of the debtors, but reversed
on the issue of liquidated damages.76 Debtors argued that the
creditor did not follow the correct Deficiency Judgment Act
procedure by failing to petition the court for a determination of the
FMV of the property within six months of the sale of the property,
as required by the Act.
77
Because the Act requires the judgment creditor to petition the
court within six months for a determination of the property's FMV,
and the creditor in this case did not do so, the court properly
designated the judgment against the debtor as fulfilled and
complete.78 The court stated that it must follow the two steps to
determine the remaining deficiency against the debtor when the
debtor's property has been sold and the sale price is less than the
amount of the outstanding debt.79 The creditor must first petition
the court to determine the FMV of the property within a six-month
time frame.8° The court further stated that if the creditor believes
that the value it has received for the property is less than the
amount of the outstanding loan, it should petition the court in
accordance with the Deficiency Judgment Act.8' If the creditor does
not petition the court within six months, an irrebutable
presumption arises that the debt is fulfilled.82
There was no dispute in Fetherman as to whether the petition
was filed within the six-month time frame. Both sides agreed that it
was not filed. Thus, the supreme court held that the debt should be
designated as fulfilled by the amount paid at the sheriffs sale,
relieving the debtors of any further obligation to the creditor.
The court, in Horbal, also considered the status of the CD at the




77. Id. at 102.
78. Fetherman, 527 A.2d at 102-03.
79. Id. at 103.
80. Id. at 102-03; see also 41 PA- CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522 (West 1998).
81. Fetherman, 527 A.2d at 104.
82. Id.
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time of the sheriff's sale. The court stated that Moxham's interest in
the CD could only be eliminated after the debt was satisfied.A1
Therefore, the creditor's right to cash in the CD was governed by
the amount of its claim at the time the CD was cashed.84 To
analyze Moxham's claim against the CD, the supreme court
reviewed provisions of the parties' Assignment of Deposit
agreement under Article I (Commercial Paper) of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.").1 The U.C.C. classifies CDs as
negotiable instruments.8
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has ruled that a CD
generally satisfies the definition of a "negotiable instrument" under
the U.C.C.87 Gordon v. Fifth Avenue Bank concerned a $13,750 CD
deposited in defendant's bank, the Fifth Avenue Bank of Pittsburgh,
on which the bank refused payment.88 Subsequent to the purchase
of the CD, the plaintiff/debtor borrowed $13,750 from the
defendant, on a demand note.8 When the plaintiff refused to pay
the demand note, the defendant applied the CD (before its
maturity) to the balance due on the note 0 The trial court found
that the note was not a negotiable instrument and that the
defendant was a holder in due course.91 The plaintiff appealed to
the superior court, which affirmed.92 The supreme court, however,
reversed the lower courts' holdings.93 The supreme court found that
a CD is a negotiable instrument because it satisfies the following
requirements: it is a written instrument, signed on behalf of a
defendant (the maker), that contains an unconditional promise to
pay the amount of the deposit plus the specified interest to the
order of the named depositor at a fixed time.4
83. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 583.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 582. "To be regarded as a negotiable instrument a writing must meet the
following requirements: (1) be signed by the maker or the drawer, (2) contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, order,
obligation or power given by the maker or drawer, except as authorized by this division; (3)
be payable on demand or at a definite time; and (4) be payable to order or bearer." 13 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104.
86. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 582. Certificates of deposit are recognized as negotiable
instruments. 13 PA CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3104(b)(3).





92. Gordon, 162 A. at 826.
93. Id. at 827.
94. Id. at 826.
1998 Horbal 627
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The Horbal court applied the standards set by the 1979 version
of the U.C.C., 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3119(b) (rather than the
1992 viersion), because this version governed at the time the events
took place.95 This section provided that an independent agreement
between the parties does not alter the negotiability of the CD.96
When one party transfers a negotiable instrument to another, the
transfer of the instrument vests the transferee with the same rights
that the transferor had in the instrument.9 7 If the instrument is.
accepted in "good faith" and the document has a designated value,
the transferee becomes a "holder in due course."98 As a holder in
due course, the transferee may transfer or negotiate the instrument
and, except as otherwise provided in section 3603 (relating to
payment or satisfaction), discharge or enforce payment in its own
name.99 A holder in due course takes the instrument free from "all
claims to it on the part of any person."1 °
The parties in Horbal stipulated that the CD met the
requirements of a negotiable instrument. 10  By virtue of its
negotiability, the CD remained independent of any prior agreements
between the parties, which meant that Moxham's rights to the CD
came to fruition at the same time, and were identical to the
debtor's rights at the CD's inception.10 2 Moxhan was a holder in
due course of the CD, the supreme court held, which gave Moxham
the absolute right to enforce payment in its own name upon
default.9 3 Moxham's absolute right to the CD upon the the debtors'
default, as a holder in due course, meant that the CD could no
longer be classified as the Horbals' "personal" asset when they
defaulted on the loan because the CD was used as collateral for the
loan.104 The legislature designed the Deficiency Judgment Act to
shield the personal assets of debtors - determining the status of a
debtor's assets is the key to whether the Act applies. 0 5 The court
further held, on the date of the sale of the debtors' property, the
CD was not classified as personal property, indicating that the Act
95. Horbal v. Moxham Nat'l Bank, 697 A.2d 577, 582 (Pa. 1997).
96. Id. at 582. See also 13 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3119(b) (West 1998).
97. Id, at 582. See also 13 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3201(a) (West 1998).
98. Id. at 582. See also 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3302(a) (West 1998).
99. Id. at 582. See also 13 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (West 1998).
100. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 582. See also 13 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. §3305(1) (West 1998).
101. Id. at 582.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 582-83.
104. Id at 583.
105. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 583.
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did not apply to the CD.1°6 Because the Act did not apply, Moxham
had the option of liquidating the CD and applying the proceeds to
the existing debt created by the Horbals' default on the loan.10
Justice Castille supported the superior court's position that the
Act offers the creditor a level of security by allowing the collection
of items pledged as collateral when a debtor defaults.108 The
assignment between the parties acts as an exchange of obligations
and ultimately equalizes their respective rights.' °9 The superior
court made a distinction between a legal and an equitable
assignment, a differentiation based on how much authority and
control the assignee maintains.110 A "legal assignment" offers total
authority to the assignee equal to the complete interest, granting
the assignee total authority to manage the property as though it
were his own.' An "equitable assignment" grants the assignee
merely a present interest in the assignment."' The distinction
between the two types of assignments lies in whether the assignee
could feasibly fulfill the requirements of the assignment when the
assignee does not have the authority to do sO.1l3 For either
assignment to be valid, both parties must have intended to enter
into the assignment."
4
It must be noted, however, that the assignee's authority over the
assignment will not eclipse that of the assignor, as held in Himes v.
Cameron County."5 In Himes, the parties entered into a valid
contract that assigned the right to construction project progress
payments." 6 Payment was to be made incrementally, with a
percentage of each payment retained by the assignor until the
project was completed." 7 The court examined whether funds were
to be paid to the assignee directly and, if so, what rights the
assignor had to retain its fixed percentage of the funds, as stated in
the assignment." 8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the









114. Purman, 56 A.2d at 88.
115. Himes v. Cameron County Construction Corp., 444 A.2d 98 (Pa. 1982).





assignor and that as the work was completed, funds would be paid
in conformity with the assignment contract agreed to by the
parties.
119
Courts apply the same principles to assignments as any other
contractual arrangement when analyzing the rights of the assignor
and assignee. In Moxham, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
noted its earlier decision in United States Nat'l Bank v. Campbell
as support for this principle. 120 Campbell concerned an agreement
between the United States Mortgage and Realty Company and two
insolvent Johnstown, Pennsylvania banks, the United States Trust
Company of Johnstown and the United States Savings & Trust
Company of Conemaugh.'21 The agreement stated that United States
Mortgage and Realty would receive a portion of funds paid (in this
instance on a life insurance policy), to the two institutions (after
deducting expenses) in return for contributions to the deficits of
the insolvent institutions. 122 The policy beneficiary, the United
States Trust Company, was entitled to receive the proceeds of the
policy.1
23
When the United States National Bank demanded repayment of
its contributions outside the confines of the assignment agreement,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that these transactions
violated the assignment and conflicted with the intent of the
assignment. 124 The court held that expenses could be withheld from
payments to the assignors prior to the assignee receiving its
interest in the assignment. 125 The court reasoned that the intentions
and standards set forth in the assignment were enforceable and
applied to all parties to the assignment.
126
Justice Castille, in Horbal v. Moxham, examined the assignment
provision that granted Moxham authority to liquidate the full or
partial value of the CD without any written or oral communication
to the debtors. 27 The CD would only be returned to the debtors if
the parties agreed to this action independent of the assignment
contract, or if the debtors completely paid their debt. 28 The court
119. Id. at 100.
120. United States Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 47 A.2d 697 (Pa. 1946).
121. Campbell, 47 A.2d at 698-99.
122. Id. at 699.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 699-702.
125. Id. at 700.
126. Campbell, 47 A.2d at 701.




further stated that the Horbals and Moxham were free to modify
any arrangements specified in the original assignment. 12 Justice
Castille found that because the parties intended the CD to be
collateral for the debt, the right to liquidate the CD shifted to
Moxham when the Horbals defaulted on the loan.'30 Therefore, the
CD was no longer the personal property of the debtors at the time
of the sheriff's sale.1 1 Application of the Deficiency Judgment Act
at the time of the sale of the real property would have been
incorrect.132 Justice Castille would have affirmed the decision of the
superior court to protect the creditor's interest in items pledged as
collateral for loans on real property because that would offer the
creditor a way to reduce its losses on defaulted loans.
1'
The opinion in support of reversal, by Justice Newman, was
based on the principle that the assignment of the CD and the
payment of the loan were bound together for the purpose of paying
the loan.'3 Further, Moxham could only liquidate the CD if there
was an unpaid amount remaining on the debt.1' Justice Newman
noted that Moxham failed to petition the court for the FMV of the
property within the six-month time frame of the sheriffs sale. 136
When this is not done, the judgment is deemed paid in full
according to the Act.13 7 Because there was no petition for the FMV
of the real property within the time limits set forth in the Act, the
Horbals were relieved of any further obligations on the debt to
Moxham.13
Justice Newman found that the Act established a method for a
creditor to reduce its losses on a defaulted loan when real property
is sold at an amount less than the value of the original loan.13
Justice Newman, however, also recognized that the FMV is the
value to be used to determine the difference between the unpaid
balance of the loan and what the creditor may seek in judgment




132. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 583.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 585-86.
135. Id. at 586.
136. Id.
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property's FMV within six months of the sale, the court presumes
that the creditor has received full satisfaction and the debtor has
no further obligation on the loan.
41
Justice Newman's view is at odds with Justice Castille's due to
their differing applications of statutory law to the facts of the case.
Justice Castille based his interpretation on the negotiable
instruments provisions of Article III of the U.C.C.142 Justice
Newman, conversely, applied the secured transactions provisions of
Article IX of the U.C.C.'" Based on secured transactions law,
Justice Newman stated that Moxham only received a security
interest in the assignment and, therefore, was required to meet the
guidelines set forth in the Act.'" This security interest does not
provide the same flexibility and authority to Moxham as Justice
Castille's negotiable instruments analysis.'"
The opinion in support of reversal also noted that the agreement
between the Horbals and Moxham granted a security interest to
Moxham in all debts incurred by the Horbals.'" Therefore,
classifying Moxham as a secured creditor would leave the Horbals
some rights in the CD. 47 Justice Newman also found that an
assignment gives the assignee a future claim equal to the secured
loan amount and thus, places a condition on the assignment. 4
Although an assignment may appear complete on its face, it is only
as good as the debt it is used to secure, as held in Seip v.
Laubach.'
49
In Seip, the defendant borrowed a sum of money from the
plaintiffs and signed a note promising to repay the debt.15°
Sometime later, the defendant signed a note securing a debt to the
Cement National Bank ("Bank") while the debt to the plaintiff
remained unpaid.' 5' The defendant was the executor of his father's
estate and offered to assign his interest in the estate to the Cement
National Bank as additional security for the debt he owed to the
141. Id.
142. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 585, see also 13 Pk CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-22.
143. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 585, see also 13 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9101-14.
144. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 585.
145. Id. at 585-86.
146. Id. at 586.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 585.
149. Seip v. Laubach, 4 A.2d 149, 151 (Pa. 1939).
150. Id. at 149-50.
151. Id.
Bank. 152 When the plaintiffs sued the Bank and the defendant for
repayment on the note, the Bank responded that it held no assets
of the defendant because any funds or future claims held by the
Bank were merely collateral for defendant's loans.'6
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explored whether the
plaintiffs could include the Bank in their claim on the note.15 In its
analysis, the court decided that the plaintiffs had no claim against
the Bank or any of the defendant's rights to his father's estate held
by the Bank. 1' The defendant's rights in his father's estate gave the
Bank an additional way to reduce its loss if the defendant defaulted
on the loan. 1' Thus, the court held that the defendant's assignment
of his interest in his father's estate to the Bank only became
effective if he failed to repay his loan.157 The court interpreted this
arrangement as a conditional assignment that, although it appeared
facially effective, was legally enforceable only if the defendant
defaulted on his Bank loan. 1' Thus, the assignment was conditional
and acted only as security for an existing debt.5 9
In addition to his application of secured transactions principles
to the assignment, Justice Newman, in Horbal, also found that the
court must review an assignment in light of the situation at the
time of its creation. 16° In Biddle v. Biddle, the supreme court held
that parole evidence may be admitted to determine the intent of
the parties.161 The plaintiff, in Biddle, argued that the court should
admit parole evidence regarding the classification of the plaintiff's
assignment on a future claim to an estate securing a loan from
defendants. 62 The assignment appeared facially valid, but the
plaintiff argued that he intended it only as security for the loan.'6
To determine whether the assignment was a security interest or
absolute, the plaintiff requested that parole evidence be admitted to
clarify the intention of the parties. 16 4 The court held that parole
evidence is admissible to show the meaning of the parties when the
152. Id. at 150.
153. Id.
154. Seip, 4 A.2d at 150.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 151.
158. Id.
159. Seip, 4 A.2d at 151.
160. Horbal v. Moxham Nat'l Bank, 697 A.2d 577, 585-86 (Pa 1997).
161. Biddle v. Biddle, 70 A.2d at 282 (Pa. 1950).






The Horbals assigned their interest in the CD to Moxham
National Bank, intending that the CD act only as a method to get
the mortgage on the Johnstown property.166 Justice Newman found
that the assignment met the conditions of 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9203(a) and that when the assignment was initiated, Moxham had
only a security interest in the CD.167 Thus, because Moxham did not
have an absolute assignment, it had to comply with the guidelines
of the Deficiency Judgment Act to reach the CD. 168
Although Moxham, as the assignee, could have taken a part of
the value of the CD between the time of default and the sheriff's
sale, it had to return control of the CD to the Horbals, as assignors,
when the debt ceased to exist.169 By not requesting the court's
determination of the FMV within the time provisions set forth in
the Act, Moxham, by an irrebutable presumption, must accept the
obligation of the Horbals as completed.170 Because Moxham failed
to abide by the guidelines of the Act, and it only had a security
interest in the assignment, Justice Newman concluded that
Moxham had no right to liquidate the CD.' 71 He further found that
it should return any funds generated by this process to the original
owners, the Horbals.172
Justice Newman mentioned, however, that the conflicting
opinions arose in this case because of Moxham's failure to follow
the provisions of the Act. 73 If Moxham had petitioned the court
and received a determination of FMV, the debt remaining on the
mortgage would have been limited to the amount in excess of the
FMV.74 Thus, Justice Newman concluded, if liquidating the CD
could have further reduced the resulting amount, Moxham would
have had the right to do so.175
Procedurally, both the concurring and dissenting opinions are
165. Id. at 282-83.
166. Horbal, at 579.
167. Id. at 586. An enforceable security interest is created when: (1) the collateral is
in the possession of the secured party pursuant to an agreement or the debtor has signed a
security agreement that contains a description of the collateral; (2) value has been given; and
(3) the debtor has rights in the collateral. 13 PA CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9203(a).
168. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 585-86.








correct. The Deficiency Judgment Act clearly outlines the
requirements for liquidating personal property of a debtor in
default. The six-month time frame provided in the Act gives the
creditor time to comply and determine how much more it is
entitled to receive from the debtor after the sale takes place. If the
creditor has not followed this process, the creditor, in effect,
accepts whatever price it receives at the sale. Any further
obligation by the debtor is relieved.
As an instrument intended to act as security for a loan, the CD
.meets the requirements of Article IX of the U.C.C., as Justice
Newman found in his opinion in support of reversal. Under this
analysis, the CD seems to be intended for security purposes only.
After all, it is the intent of the parties that determines the true
nature of an assignment.
Justice Newman also clearly notes that parole evidence ("use of
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the assignment")
applies in situations such as in Horbal v. Moxham to determine the
intent of the parties regarding the assignment of property. 176 The
intent of the parties in Horbal, therefore, determines the specific
purpose of the CD's assignment. Viewing the transaction
independently, the CD acted as collateral for the Horbal's
Johnstown property. Thus, it appears that the CD falls within the
confines of Article IX of the U.C.C.
A review of the facts and the wording of the assignment,
however, suggests otherwise. In the assignment, the Horbals
granted Moxham a full power of attorney and the right to withdraw
all or part of the account without notice to or further consent by
the Horbals1 77 If the parties had worded the assignment to provide
that the Horbals only pledged the CD to secure the loan, Article IX
would apply.
The assignment, however, acted as a contract between the
parties that authorized Moxham to liquidate the CD upon default of
the loan. The contract stated that the Horbals offered the CD to
obtain the loan and if they failed to perform the terms of the
assignment contract by repaying the loan, Moxham could liquidate
the CD in lieu of receiving loan payments. 78
If the Horbals wanted to protect their interest in the CD, they
could have negotiated different contract terms or paid the loan
176. Id.
177. Id. at 579.
178. Horbal, 697 A.2d at 579.
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balance. Obviously, Moxham would not accept a contract that
offered them no protection against default. In fact, the court may
construe that type of arrangement as an illusory contract, as
Justice Castille reasoned in support of affirmance. 119 The Horbals
could receive the benefits of the real property without offering any
recoverable consideration. The debtors could, essentially, deny
payment on the loan balance and still recover the CD when they
defaulted on the loan.
Policy should support what is in the best interests of business in
this type of situation. On one hand, receiving collateral should
protect lenders from defaulting debtors. On the other hand, policy
should protect debtors from unauthorized claims against personal
property. The Deficiency Judgment Act can protect both creditors
and debtors when it applies. In this instance, the Horbals agreed to
the conditions set forth in the assignment. It would have been
unrealistic to assume that they could recover the full value of the
CD after they defaulted on the loan.
Due to the split decision, there is clearly merit in both views on
the application of the Act. In fact, the superior court did not reach
a unanimous decision. By a narrow majority, the superior court
chose not to apply the Act. The supreme court's split decision
automatically affirmed the lower court's decision.
The definition of "personal property" and when an item becomes
personal property are not clear. The legislature must provide a
comprehensive definition of this term to avoid future controversies,
such as that in Horbal v. Moxham. For the Act to apply, the
property used as collateral, must be narrowly categorized as to its
application. When the Deficiency Judgment Act is applicable, the
law dictates the necessary process for a successful claim.
Specifying the exact process for loan repayment, collateral
return, and/or collateral retention may also avoid this problem in
default situations. This procedure is more akin to contract law than
to secured transactions or negotiable instruments law. It is
unreasonable to permit a defaulting debtor to utilize mortgaged real
property without a penalty or allow recovery of personal property
used as collateral for the loan. This scenario would shift all of the
burden and risk to the creditor, which would not set an attractive
or prudent standard for lending institutions. The Horbals should
179. Id. at 583. An "illusory" contract is "an expression cloaked in promissory terms,
but which, upon closer examination, reveals that the promisor has not committed himself in
any manner." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 748 (6th ed. 1990).
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have expected to lose their "deposit" when they failed to fulfill
their commitment.
David C. Bruening

